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FRICTION IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CULTURAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WORLD
Among key transformational insights is the necessity to deal with the world as it is-not as it used to be and not as we wish it were. Sound strategic thinking recognizes the limits of our intelligence, in all senses of the term.
-Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense, for Policy 1 America's ability to remain in a world leadership role has never before depended so much on being able to influence foreign populations. Yet, in the years since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a sharp rise in anti-Americanism: "Anti-Americanism is now like a religion around the world."
2 Such hostility and resentment comes largely as a result of trying to transplant too directly culture that works in America to the rest of the world. It is intuitive for most Americans to feel that modernity and the pursuit of individual liberties are the only viable way for humanity to progress. Yet, Americans might well be blind to what the rest of the world thinks and ignorant of competitive culturally diverse alternatives. Such lack of comprehension in a world where the U.S. population is a distinct minority risks America's future. The U.S. must determine how to bring about the future it envisions in a world that is increasingly hostile.
America today is confronted with several competing non-Western ideologies that Americans seem culturally blind to acknowledging. These competing ideologies are rooted in growing world cultural differences with the West, as alluded to in Arab News.com by a female Saudi reporter based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia:
For too long the world has lived with one dominant culture imposing its view on everyone else…. The West can't for the moment come to grips with the fact that they occupy this planet with other individuals who have a different set of values which are as true as theirs. Muslims are not the only ones who feel the intrusive and high-handed behaviour of the West. We see examples of this kind of attitude all around the world from Latin America to Africa and Asia. 3 Success in promoting the U.S. world-view, and winning the Global War on Terror (GWOT) specifically, rests in Americans recognizing their own cultural uniqueness and developing a high level of cultural savvy in dealing with more traditional cultures. The U.S. can find more attainable foreign policy success using indirect strategies, though this would be against prevailing instincts. 4 With cultural savvy, the U.S. can apply the spirit of Colonel T.E. Lawrence:
"Better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their way, and our time is short. 5 A key part of a constructive grand strategy is in seeing the "world as it is--not as it used to be and not as we wish it were." 6 "Seeing the world as it is" is a part of the competency of strategic objectivity-seeing the reality and what is realistic and attainable over time." Cultural savvy allows the U.S. to see with strategic objectivity and act in a manner reflecting cultural astuteness.
The World the U.S. Envisions
Americans tend to believe that since the U.S. led the free world to victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the U.S. will continue as the leader of a free and democratic world modeled after itself. One can see this optimism in the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS):
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom-and a single sustainable model for national success: Freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. 7 Such presumption tends to explain every opposition in dramatic terms of "good and evil" and see others as either with us or against us. Often, such language is directed at a world audience but is cloaked in U.S. historical and cultural experience. 8 Labeling "black and white" in the modernizing world can be extremely challenging when most transnational issues are more in the "grey" area and involve traditional cultures. For example, sorting out good and evil regarding radical Islam has proved a vexing problem for western leaders who attempt to de-link extremists from non-extremists, as highlighted by President Bush in describing radical Islam:
"The Islamic Radical Threat to this century greatly resembles the bankrupt ideology of the last.
The murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals is the greatest challenge of our century. Yet, in many ways, this fight resembles the struggle against Communism in the last century." 9 Only the word "radical" distinguishes the terrorists from 1.2 billion Muslims, many of whom may be nonviolent radicals. "Even support by 1% of the Muslim population would equate to over 12 million enemies." 10 President Bush may have over dramatized the radical challenge but, nonetheless, radical or populist Islam is a grave ideological threat because it appeals to the traditional Islamic cultures of many societies. The U.S. must learn how to deal with disturbing religious trends, as well as how to promote democracy, without ceding ground to a competing ideology that is inextricably intertwined with a religion. Contemplating such thought is hard for secular bound Americans who are traditionally very averse in discussing "church and state" issues in the context of public diplomacy. It is only slightly less difficult when other ideologies are involved because of the U.S. belief in the right to dissent. Hence, the U.S. must first understand what its long-term interests are and then how best to pursue them in a world that does not share the U.S. cultural experience.
U.S. interests flow from the Nation's desired world-view for the future. The U.S. worldview can be summarized rather succinctly: To seek a global world order in which the U.S. can prosper with its values intact. The U.S. does not seek direct rule, but the realization of U.S.
values suggests a desired world in which the U.S. is first among equals in a multi-lateral world, though convincing the world it is not unilateral will require great cultural savvy. Such a world order would be a peaceful global community of democratic societies engaged in fruitful commerce, that respects human rights, freedom of religion, rule of secular law, and the individual pursuit of happiness. This world-view is rooted firmly in a non-traditional American culture that is a product of America's unique historical experience. It is entirely reasonable for the U.S. to seek to shape a world order favorable to itself and founded in its own experience.
Yet, it is problematic in dealing with more traditional cultures where America cannot wish success into being. The big question is how can the U.S. best pursue the world it seeks? The answer lies in understanding our own culture and that of others and then acting with objectivity.
As Sun Tzu would say: "Know your enemy and know yourself and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." American culture is a Western Hemisphere "New World Paradigm" that has historically had the challenge of assimilating immigrants from nearly every culture in the world. In such an environment, any foreign culture is seen as a problem to overcome. U.S. success has come from blurring cultural differences and finding common ground among disparate peoples to separation of church and state, and successful integration of foreign immigration. As the first "universal nation," one that had to accommodate many diverse immigrants, the U.S. does not include, to the same degree, the elements of hierarchy, community, tradition, and custom so evident in other cultures. 30 "The United States' fundamental belief in exceptionalism is its righteousness and moral superiority over other nations." 31 Americans must be sensitive to being perceived as chauvinistic towards more traditional cultures. "Chauvinism-Americans think America is the biggest and the best, the newest and the richest, and all others are a bit slow, old fashioned, rather poor and somewhat on the small side." 32 Under this logic, it is argued that everything with the "Old World" is flawed and everything with the "New World" is superior. By understanding American exceptionalism, the U.S. can better understand its deep-rooted inclinations and keep from applying "one shoe fits all" solutions. In a sense, the "manifest destiny," which led Americans to conquer the North American continent, has been rekindled and seeks to reshape the world under American principles of social and economic success.
Exceptionalism lies at the heart of America's cultural uniqueness but other historical experience also shapes its culture.
America's history is one of a search for commonality as a result of the rejection of the Old World and its diverse cultures. This search led to the embracement of a secular culture, which while respecting all religions, placed emphasis in public life on common, shared symbols.
With this common focus, ethnicity and traditional culture became secondary to being an Switzerland (four separate and equal cantons divided by language) demonstrate that even in advanced first world nations, linguistic divisions define identity and lines of conflict which, in some cases, threaten national integrity. So, America's success at stripping away foreign languages from immigrants through its tried and tested formula for assimilation is a domestic success story. On the other hand, American lack of proficiency in other languages impedes cultural astuteness, by not letting Americans hear the exact words others use, which can telegraph very subtle nuances. As in any language, the specific words we choose can offer very telling clues to hidden meanings, the confidence the speaker might have in giving information, or any number of other nuances.
A modern evolution of the American psyche is "political correctness (PC)." America's value of individual freedom, in conflict with commonalities, has led to a unique outlook in regard to certain issues where stereotyping is a contrary cultural imperative. Americans are constantly distracted by exceptions to every rule and have it ingrained in them not to generalize about people. "Don't judge a book by its cover," as the axiom goes. While this is commendable social engineering domestically, it is simplistic to ignore generalities about people overseas.
Being PC makes Americans try to overlook any fault with major religions or major groups and leads us to think that all people pretty much want the same things-basic needs and a chance for prosperity. Traditional cultures are by definition collective in outlook, not individual.
Americans are just not equipped to be PC at home and not-PC abroad.
The "New World Paradigm" is evident whenever Americans interact with another culture. strategists, and other national security professionals lack competency in cultural savvy.
Cross-cultural savvy implies that an officer can see perspectives outside his or her own boundaries. It does not imply, however, that the officer abandons the Army or American culture in pursuit of a relativistic worldview. Instead, the future strategic leader is grounded in national and Army values, but is also able to anticipate, understand, and empathize with the values, assumptions, and norms of other groups, organizations, and nations.
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Most importantly, leaders in national security must be able to translate this cultural savvy into strategies and actions that protect and advance U.S. interests. Simply said, cultural savvy is the recognition that culture is not neutral and it requires higher and more mature levels of strategic skills. 36 The nuances of culturally savvy at this level can be illustrated:
Koreans avoid compromise, and yet Americans seek it-cultural biases. 37 However, often cultural savvy can overcome cultural biases. For example, it is essential to understand when negotiating with the Koreans that personal bonds developed over time are critical to negotiations and that, culturally, they are averse to compromising, since they are a "win-lose" culture. 38 In such cultures, there can be no compromise since compromise is viewed as a loss.
Americans come from a "win-win" culture, where both sides can claim victory by ceding ground and achieving resolution. Success is founded on building a long-term relationship and fostering "win-win" solutions. Similarly, Iran is a traditional culture that values "face" and has more patience than the U.S.-or Europe for that matter. Iran might have learned from the North Korean model for nuclear development. 39 Similar challenges are faced in nuclear negotiations:
Iran intentionally exploits Western idealistic hopes of a negotiated compromise simply to diplomatically prevent Western military action and buy more time to pursue their national objective-development of a nuclear device. 40 In dealing with such "win-lose" cultures, the prudent American negotiator needs to come in with extremely detailed preparation in order to gain concessions, avoid falling into the cultural fault of wishing a compromise and losing unnecessary ground, and develop mutual personal respect with the foreign negotiator(s). When he does this, he is applying cultural savvy. Preparation and cultural savvy helps the negotiator impose a "win."
Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), is a text-book success for being "culturally savvy," in so far as "wining hearts and minds" in an Islamic country, to the extent possible by an outside non-Islamic power. In Afghanistan, the U.S. learned from Soviet failure.
Rather than committing large formations of conventional forces, the U.S. backed the friendly Northern Alliance. Consequently, Afghan forces led the charge against the Taliban and the U.S.
turned the hunters into the hunted. U.S. advisors showed incredible cultural savvy working with the Northern Alliance and newer Afghan coalition members to steer them toward the path of modern democracy, accepting local Islamic adaptations. The nascent democratic Afghan government is on its way to building a representative nation and providing for its own security, despite a resilient Taliban/Al-Qaida residual movement. Afghanistan is not without its threats to U.S. interests when one considers that a free Afghanistan is now the world's leader in opium production and exportation, but U.S. interests were advanced and a relationship now exists to address the narcotics production issue.
If there is any long-term irony in Afghanistan for the United States, it will likely revolve around the U.S. being perhaps too accommodating in adapting Western style democracy to an Islamic nation. While U.S. soldiers swear an allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, which is a secular document built upon a Judeo-Christian foundation, but not subordinate to it, the Afghan Constitution does just the opposite. The U.S. Constitution provides for the separation of church and state and goes to great length to protect individual liberties. The
Afghan Constitution clearly subordinates Afghanistan and all its citizens to the Islamic holy book, and its related civil laws. 41 American soldiers unwittingly fought on behalf of an Afghanistan Constitution, subordinate to Sharia law, that denies freedom of religion as understood by Americans and promotes Islamic theocracy:
In fact, Article 130 says that, in the absence of an explicit statute or constitutional limit, the Supreme Court should decide "in accord with Hanafi jurisprudence," one of the four main Sunni schools of Sharia. (Some forms of Hanafi law give a women's court testimony only half the weight of a man's.) Supreme Court justices are required to have higher education "in law or Islamic jurisprudence" and, like the president and Cabinet members, must take an oath to "support justice and righteousness in accord with the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam."
The draft provides no guarantees of religious freedom and says only "other religions are free to perform their religious ceremonies within the limits of the provision of law" (2) . Already, as in Iran, the draft outlaws any political party "contrary to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam..." (35) . If the state declares that its laws and decisions are identical with Islam, then any opposition can be punished as violating Islam. In Afghanistan, this is not a theoretical question. 42 Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), on the other hand, is the text-book "missed opportunity." While the U.S. and the "coalition of the willing" won the conventional war quickly, the U.S. was not ready to seize the peace through a combination of two strategic missteps: lack of "Phase IV" post-hostilities planning, and, the "firing of the Iraqi Army," civil service and police forces. 43 As Sun Tzu advised, "Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this." 44 World War II savvy would have recognized the need to plan for the post war (Phase IV) time frame early with the specific intent of including as many former regime elements as possible in the post-war reconstruction. In WWII, the U.S. used Japanese and German governance and personnel fairly effectively. While there is little doubt that there were "bad" Baathist elements in some positions, it is likely the U.S. confused the local cultural intricacies of being "pro-Saddam" and being employed, leading to no government functioning. 45 In the same manner, the U.S. confused anti-Saddamism for pro-U.S. sentiment. What was under appreciated was the long-term implications of being "freed" by "infidels" on the culturally proud Muslims when U.S. forces had to occupy the nation. …that organizational culture is the key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. 50 Dealing with foreign national culture in a constructive way was echoed more recently by a senior U.K. officer: "The U.K. Army was able to control ridiculously large numbers of people, particularly in India, with small numbers of junior personnel by good personal relations." 51 With a personnel rotation system that encouraged "homesteading" throughout the empire, the U.K.
was able to build a pool of highly talented civilian and military personnel with a near native sense of indigenous issues and intrigue. As such, the U.K. was very adept at playing one local group against another and pursuing successful "…alternative forms of control, and a whole variety of inducements to persuade subject-peoples to respect their imperial overlords."
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Using success as the metric, there is a direct power correlation: culturally savvy = fewer contentious issues and less troops needed.
Another point about the U.K. success is linguistic. While the U.K. has been protected by the English Channel from the rest of Europe, their officers have historically spoken a second language-French. British officers were bilingual even when it was their policy to "make the world England" during the French and Indian War time period. 53 The French language not only facilitated dealing with the noble class of the time, but also gave the British officer corps a window to the world, since French was the "lingua franca" of diplomacy before the Second World War. Britain was able to transform itself for its international role by learning cultural savvy and developing a "dynamic and evolving system, always going forward to new destinies…." 54 U.S. success as it pursues its world-view is also dependent on cultural savvy and a willingness to learn and adapt to the specific situation. Turkey's experience illustrates this. What most Americans find difficult to accept, because it is counter-intuitive to our experience, is that radical Islam's success is directly proportional to Western lack of savvy in pulling the Islamic world into modernity. For the jihad phenomenon is more than the sum of individual terrorist acts extending from Bali through Jakarta, to New Delhi, Tunisia, Riyadh, Istanbul, Casablanca, Madrid and London. It is an ideological outpouring comparable to the early days of Islam by which Islam's radical wing seeks to sweep away secularism, pluralistic values and Western institutions wherever Muslims live. Its dynamism is fueled by the conviction that the designated victims are on the decline and lacking the will to resist. Any event that seems to confirm these convictions compounds the revolutionary dynamism. 63 Unfortunately for Western liberalism, Islam's radicals promote an ideology that regards itself as superior to anything written by men. Simply put, these radicals confront Muslims at home and in Western countries with having to choose between God's law and man's law-and
God's law is winning out.
Radical Islamism is a byproduct of modernization itself, arising from the loss of identity that accompanies the transition to a modern, pluralist society. It is no accident that so many recent terrorists, from Sept. 11's Mohamed Atta to the murderer of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh to the London subway bombers, were radicalized in democratic Europe and intimately familiar with all of democracy's blessings. More democracy will mean more alienation, radicalization and-yes, unfortunately-terrorism.
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The U.S. and the modern world need to reframe this question. To do this, the policy makers and strategists must develop cultural savvy and often do things that are counter-intuitive to our own culture. It is intuitive for Americans to keep looking for a "reasonable" Islamic main-street and counter-intuitive that the majority of Muslims see
Islamic law as more reasonable than secular law. Many Americans prefer to believe that America is simply misunderstood, and the solution lies in reaching out better to the Islamic world. Americans, who believe this notion, are culturally reaching for commonalities and glossing over deep cultural differences that must be reconciled in pulling traditional Islamic societies into the modern world. As Colonel T.E. Lawrence correctly recognized in the First World War: "We must also arrange the minds of the enemy so far as we could reach them…." 65 The implications are clear. We must first understand that we can influence the mindset, and second, our ability to do so has limitations.
One key cultural difference between the West and Islamic peoples misunderstood by
Westerners is the role of the Koran, the Islamic holy book, as civil law. In the U.S., a very religious nation by western standards, religious law is adopted into civic law, where its merits can be debated and adjusted in a secular manner. Many Islamic nations have the Koran as an integral part of the civil law at different levels. This makes sense to a traditional culture in a nonWestern region. Yet it means Islam, as a political ideology, promotes a theocracy with a rule of law more sacrosanct than the U.S. Constitution.
Drawing a disrespectful cartoon of Mohammad is a grave offence under Shariah law…Islam does not accept the Western and Christian distinction between what
is "objectively a sin", and what is "actually" one. For them, "ignorance of the law is no excuse," ever. Whereas we hold that in the eye of God, or even of a court, it might well be an excuse. Likewise, we recognize compulsion as an excuse; whereas, in the Islamic tradition, this is a non-starter. That is why, to use an extreme case, a strict Shariah court might sentence a woman to death for adultery, who has been raped. For she is, objectively, is an adulteress. The sentence might not seem fair, but that very "fairness" is a Western notion. A good Shariah judge is a "strict constructionist," like a good American Supreme Court judge. He cannot rewrite his Constitution. He can be merciful, however. Individual Islamic citizens lavishly contribute to NGOs of dubious distinctions, financing the spread of extremist ideology and a radical way of life at home and in the West. 70 The resulting conflict is risking the leaders own elite status and the modernization of their nations. 71 The leaders are necessarily duplicitous; for the short-term, their faith is intertwined with ideology and governance.
Centers of Gravity
How should the U.S. confront such a threat to its world view when the cultural differences are so great and the other culture is also internally conflicted? Again, a study of successful moderate Islamic regimes gives the U.S. starting points for relations with the Islamic world and clues as to the proper centers of gravity in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Too often, Americans look for physical centers of gravity. In the case of Islamic extremism, both enemy and friendly centers of gravity are more ideological or cultural than physical. To understand these centers of gravity, and how to get at them, requires cultural savvy. As Colonel T.E. Lawrence remands, success is dependent on being able to say: "The enemy I knew almost like my own side." 72 In the Islamic world, there are three centers of gravity (COG), that stand out in the GWOT:
The first critical COG is leadership. Islamic cultures are traditional cultures and very hierarchical in nature. In such cultures, the leader is deferred to and largely obeyed as long as he has the legitimacy recognized by his traditional culture. The U.S. must support friendly, positive leadership and discredit negative and extremist leadership. There are four main areas of approach Western nations can take under the rubric of this center of gravity. These vulnerabilities can be addressed with specific objectives and concepts:
Under the leadership COG, central to success is finding strong Islamic leaders who can both work with the U.S. to further national objectives and have the credibility to work with their people. By using strong Islamic leaders, one exploits the vulnerability in that such collective societies are supportive of their own legitimate rulers. Such a leader must have the stature to maintain the respect of tribal elders, warlords, clerics and the people at large. With this respect, the leader controls sufficient forces to regain control of rogue elements within his borders.
Ideally, such a leader would be Western educated and have the savvy to engineer a complex hybrid of Western democratic egalitarianism with a local brand of democracy, under the rule of secular law. Like-minded allies are much better at communicating with their own people and enjoy, as a general rule, cultural trust. American cultural biases are so ingrained that they will always be a factor. Hence, the U.S. should seek to minimize the physical contact between U.S.
forces and the foreign public as much as possible in culturally distinct places as the Middle East and Asia. The smarter concept is to encourage and support people that will work positively with the United States. The payoffs from such an approach could be incredible through an immediate reduction of cultural clashes. There is no better press than a foreign leader explaining America's positive virtues, as we have witnessed with President Musharraf of Pakistan. 73 America's energies are better used indirectly in promoting ideas, programs, and leaders whose collective efforts lead over time to the world the U.S. envisions.
A second avenue under the leadership COG is to invite Islamic clerics and tribal elders to work with you, recognizing them as a vulnerability. Islam fosters traditional hierarchical social networks. The highest form of respect an outsider can demonstrate is to recognize both formal and informal social and religious networks. In such traditional societies, it is much more efficient to work with these existing leaders than it is to bypass them, intentionally or not. 74 Cultural savvy allows one to recognize the relative power tribal elders and clerics have over their communities. A given foreign presence explained to the people by their own leaders normally provides more appeal, credibility and legitimacy than if a foreigner attempts to communicate directly with the masses. As such, every effort should be made to work with these leaders, rather than ignore them. Moderate Islamic clerics, in particular, should be seen as having a significant impact on the local national Islamic population and can be an invaluable ally in motivating the local population to reject extremism. Their critical positions in the Islamic faith and their ability to help isolate radical clerics and extremists make them key allies.
A third avenue under the leadership COG is that the U.S. and its allies must be willing to keep targeting radical extremist leaders with kinetic means. They are a vulnerability because extremist behavior is viewed as abnormal in a collectivist society where people look for the common good. It is common sense to target and neutralize radical extremists using the full spectrum of legitimate powers available to the state, given they will not compromise with the West. Islamic culture respects strength and radicals do not lend themselves to compromising on principle. However, cultural savvy should cause pause to understand the impact of inflicting casualties and ensuing blood feuds that should be avoided:
"An eye for an eye" or the current Arab saying, Dam butlab dam ("Blood demands blood")… The blood feud is an organic part and inevitable consequence of the intensive group cohesion which characterizes the Arab ethos. A society in which great emphasis is placed on the kin group, in which the individual interests are subordinated to the interests of family and lineage, and in which, in addition, honor is given the highest priority, it is inevitable that every homicide, premeditated or accidental, should give rise to blood revenge and trigger a chain reaction that soon involves an increasing number of men and groups… Just as the taking of blood revenge was considered a value and redounded to one's honor, so was fighting in general. Islamic public media will be more objective in its coverage, if the government demands it.
The second avenue under the information COG to pursue is to directly manipulate or shut down radical extremist web sites and Internet communications. Radical Islam is a true global insurgency with the goal of promoting the spread of extremism and "wining the hearts and minds" of undecided Muslims. Islamic extremists are extremely effective at using the Internet for command and control and to actively promote war against the U.S. and the West.
The U.S. must act decisively in this area. Such decisive action must include changing U.S. law, as needed. Radical extremist web sites must be dealt with in a similar manner to enemy radio communications during past wars. To make any distinctions between traditional radio electronic combat and web sites based on freedom of the press arguments is to cede the initiative to an enemy equally, if not more, sophisticated than the U.S. and its western allies.
The third-and most critical COG in the Islamic world-is the role of Islamic women and prospects for their liberation. Women in the Islamic world are second class citizens, codified by the Koran and reinforced by prevailing "Arab male attitudes to women: that the destiny of women, in general, and in particular of those within the family circle, is to serve the men and obey them." 81 Women's rights are a critical vulnerability. Long-term success in the field of women's rights in most of the Islamic world, however, will require significant societal reforms. If
Islamic women truly receive full civil protection and equality, it will lead to secular law. In layman's terms, free the women and you have a chance at neutralizing the males who apply scripture literally in the 9 th century sense. Liberation or equal rights for women could even trigger a "reformation" in the Islamic world to temper extremism and radicalism, reducing radical ideology to an insignificant role. Sharia, in contrast, codifies total submission of the individual to Islamic society. 82 Under the banner of women's rights, other societal reforms can usher in other pillars of democracy: minority rights, due process of law, freedom of speech, freedom of minority religions, property rights, and a judicial process to address grievances under due process of secular law. Without supporting societal reforms, terrorist organizations, like
Hamas, thrive in democracy, furthering the unfortunate prospects of "one man, one vote, one time" in a radicalized society. 83 Applying "cultural savvy," the United States can see with strategic objectivity, knowing when to act directly and when to hide its hand behind the scenes with allies. In the true Clausewitzian spirit of: "War is merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means, the U.S. must focus on end-state and recognize that in GWOT the centers of gravity are more cultural than physical." 84 Simply said, U.S. leaders must learn to be more "Machiavellian" in their relationships and planning in regard to other cultures. The U.S. must think counter-intuitively and look for indirect, and perhaps, advantageous multi-lateral arrangements to obtain its end.
These approaches ultimately lead to success, but are often built on the foundations of effective U.S. military operations.
Implications for the Military: Education and Training
Within the military, the keys to properly understanding centers of gravity (COGs) and getting at the vulnerabilities with supporting concepts of military operations are cultural education and training and foreign language training, all of which serve to provide the grounds for working better with allies in a more mutually symbiotic way.
True reform in the way Americans deal with foreign cultures is best served through longterm and sustained education, preferably learned through foreign contact before entering the military. This is a long-term strategic imperative for the Nation, but the military must confront the challenge today.
The U.S. military is actively engaged in the field around the world. Soldiers in the field can embarrass the U.S. when they make a cultural mistake, with immediate worldwide visibility, in this age of mass media and instant communications. Often, such embarrassments have strategic consequences. Soldiers may never be made perfect diplomats, but they can be educated and trained to avoid egregious cultural blunders.
Every soldier needs to understand the strategic public affairs message of both the U.S. In fact, engagement with local populations has become so crucial that mission success is often significantly affected by a soldier's ability to interact with local individuals and communities. Learning to interact with local populaces presents a major challenge for soldiers, leaders and civilians. 87 Too often, teaching culture is boiled down into the prism of simplistic "do's and don'ts that is expected to allow the service-member to leap the cultural gap." 88 The gap is more than Training is more short term focused and generally provided in response to an upcoming task and deployment. Today, the U.S. military has a very short-term focus on cultural training, which poorly postures the force for an ever increasingly "globalized" world. In the short-term, troops will better respond to cultural training if they get better "politically incorrect" training which actually provides a tangible tactical field advantage-telling them how it really is so they can build workable cultural bridges. As a part of transformation, foreign language proficiency needs to be a skill prized and rewarded by financial incentives in the military, as it is with the U.S.
Department of State. A short term U.S. military solution would be to offer all service members, regardless of rank, duty position or specialty, financial incentives that reward self-study in any number of languages of their choosing. Financial incentives should reward even the most rudimentary capabilities which could be administered on-line through Service education centers, perhaps twice a year, and linked to a Department of Defense (DoD) database for the purposes of pay and linguist availability for contingencies-without the bureaucratic and limited nature of the current Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) system, which is inadequate. 90 There is no substitute for leveraging local knowledge and "hiding one's hand" in the political-military interface with a traditional culture: skills that are dependent on mastery of the local language.
The U.S. military must make attracting linguists a major strategic priority as part of a paradigm shift if we are to reduce needless friction and enjoy greater success.
Another critical cultural education task is the art of negotiations. In cultural confrontations, every step forward is the result of negotiation. Since there are always differing purposes and agendas, soldiers need to always keep in mind how to protect U.S. positions,
while figuring out what can be reasonably bartered in the process. All negotiation is based on knowledge and skills-acquired attributes. American "legitimacy" is on the table in every negotiation. Americans like the image of being "straight shooters in a duplicitous world." Faceto-face negotiations with foreign counterparts is an area where one sees the most obvious challenges for Americans. Americans erode a "starting position" with thoughts of compromise before understanding the cultural dynamics at work. Americans will take another's word if they "look 'em in the eye" and impress them as being honorable. Americans want to believe Muslims who say their faith is tolerant and being hijacked by radicals. Yet, duplicity may be a tool to beguile "infidels" into letting their guard down. Negotiations education can level the playing field by explaining the roles and providing the strategies for success. Again, it is counter-intuitive for
Americans to work indirectly in any manner which might appear to be Machiavellian or that works at a slower pace than direct action. What American culture fails to appreciate is that the shortest distance between two positions may be cultural savvy.
Foreign language education is the long-term solution to U.S. cultural woes with the world, since language is the key for understanding critical nuances of culture. Language education and training is essential for Americans to understand their foreign counterparts. A compounding problem is the lack of elementary school foreign language education in the United
States. More often than not, foreign language instruction in the U.S.
is not yet considered a "core curriculum" course at the elementary school level. 91 An abundance of literature supports foreign language education during early child development. It is ironic that America has pushed trade globalization to promote world prosperity, and yet does not recognize the need to transform its education system to prepare tomorrow's business leaders to take advantage of the opportunities. However, one should not expect even the best language and culture training to be a panacea that can substitute for years of experience. Up to here, the point has been made that contrary to the notion of American idealism or exceptionalism, people around the world are indeed different and that is why cultural knowledge matters. With this said, while no one can realistically suppress all cultural biases, we can mitigate them by thinking counter-intuitively. "Deal(ing) with the world as it is… not as we wish it were" 93 requires curbing domestic intuitions with very precise cultural knowledge in order to discern the seen and unseen, and acting appropriately in regard to both. Education combined with experience will develop soldiers and leaders who are culturally savvy.
Conclusion
History reveals that few states have risen to dominate their epoch and no nation has been able to maintain dominance forever. Unlike past states, the U.S. does not seek to rule directly but to create a world order in which the U.S. can prosper with its values intact. Yet, as a western power, the U.S. cannot overlook the fact that the majority of the world's population no longer want direct pejorative leadership from the "white man." Americans need to think counterintuitively to their own culture in order to find successful long-term strategies for creating a better world. Such strategies must avoid mirror imaging, the trap of seeking commonalities, and idealistic wishful thinking. Given its relative minority status, the U.S. needs to apply more cultural savvy, working in the world as it is in order to build the world it desires. America has worthy goals in promoting democracy and free trade, but needs to figure out how to better pursue them more indirectly, through like-minded allies. Never before have the following words been more relevant advice for U.S. policy makers who need to identify how to sustain American leadership and promote core values, while addressing root causes of anti-Americanism clearly gaining momentum today: "Better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their way, and our time is short." 94 Cultural savvy, for the sake of it, is simply not compelling to the pragmatist, unless it provides tangible results. In today's world, pragmatic reasons to promote cultural savvy can be found in the hard reality of addressing why U.S. leadership is being challenged by friend and foe, alike. There is real need for introspection in how to adapt and overcome this "push back."
